Showing posts with label WLAN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WLAN. Show all posts

Tuesday, 8 January 2008

Aruba Technology: The Move to User-Centric Networking

Our increasingly mobile society is forcing many industries to develop ways to make their services accessible whenever and wherever customers require them. In the not too distant past, one could conduct banking transactions only at a bank branch and only during business hours. As mobile customers demanded more convenient access to banking services, banks moved away from an institution-centric model of business to a user-centric model in which banking applications were brought to the customer. The bank branch gave way to the ATM and ultimately to the smart card.
Illustration of Aruba Technology

The Shift from Institution-Centric to User-Centric Products and Services

Increased mobility for the customer, however, resulted in reduced control and security for banks. Unauthorized card duplication, phishing, and ATM substitution all skyrocketed as banking products and services moved closer to the user. The demand for mobility fostered innovations which, in turn, undermined security.

The networking industry is undergoing a similar transformation, and facing the same issues, as the banking industry. Enterprises want to enable users to work wherever and whenever it is most convenient, economical, and expeditious for them to do so - in the office, at home, in hotels, or on the road. The issue is that traditional, port-centric networks use perimeter-based security that was designed and optimized for fixed, non-mobile users. For traditional network suppliers mobility breaks security, and security precludes mobility.

Fortunately, enterprises have a new option that delivers both mobility and security - user-centric networks from Aruba. Aruba's user-centric networks integrate adaptive WLANs, identity-based security, and application continuity services into a cohesive, high-performance system that securely delivers the enterprise network wherever users work or roam. User-centric networks significantly expand the reach of traditional port-centric networks, preserving and extending investments in existing network infrastructure. Additionally, the high performance and robustness of Aruba's solutions provide the first viable alternative to wired networks, making the all-wireless office a reality.

Adaptive WLANs deliver high-performance, follow-me connectivity so users are always within reach of mission-critical information. Identity-based security associates access policies with users, not ports, enabling follow-me security that is enforced regardless of where and how the networked is accessed. Application continuity services enable follow-me applications that continue running even as the user moves between wireless LANs, wired LANs, and cellular networks.


The Components of User-Centric Networks

Aruba's user-centric networks deliver both mobility and security without compromise. The cost, convenience, and security benefits of user-centric networks are fundamentally changing how and where we work.

Aruba Solution

Aruba has integrated all of the elements required to deliver enterprise mobility - security, application, network and radio frequency (RF) management services - into a unified solution. The components of this solution include an award-winning portfolio of wireless LAN, security, diagnostic, network management, and integration products backed by a worldwide support and training organization. Components include:
  • ArubaOS operating system for delivering user-centric enterprise mobility
  • ArubaOS software modules for value-added security and mobility features including mesh networking, wireless intrusion detection, and remote access
  • Aruba Endpoint Compliance System for Network Access Control
  • Aruba Mobility Management System for centralized management
  • Aruba Mobility Controllers for flexible, high-performance support of the ArubaOS operating system and software modules
  • Aruba Access Points and Access Concentrators that provide wireless and wireline access to Aruba Mobility Controllers

Typical Applications

User-centric networks are applicable across a wide range of uses in enterprise, education, finance, government, healthcare, hospitality, and retail applications. To learn more about how Aruba's solutions are being used to enable various applications and industries, please follow the links below.

Aruba Technology: The Move to User-Centric Networking

Our increasingly mobile society is forcing many industries to develop ways to make their services accessible whenever and wherever customers require them. In the not too distant past, one could conduct banking transactions only at a bank branch and only during business hours. As mobile customers demanded more convenient access to banking services, banks moved away from an institution-centric model of business to a user-centric model in which banking applications were brought to the customer. The bank branch gave way to the ATM and ultimately to the smart card.
Illustration of Aruba Technology

The Shift from Institution-Centric to User-Centric Products and Services

Increased mobility for the customer, however, resulted in reduced control and security for banks. Unauthorized card duplication, phishing, and ATM substitution all skyrocketed as banking products and services moved closer to the user. The demand for mobility fostered innovations which, in turn, undermined security.

The networking industry is undergoing a similar transformation, and facing the same issues, as the banking industry. Enterprises want to enable users to work wherever and whenever it is most convenient, economical, and expeditious for them to do so - in the office, at home, in hotels, or on the road. The issue is that traditional, port-centric networks use perimeter-based security that was designed and optimized for fixed, non-mobile users. For traditional network suppliers mobility breaks security, and security precludes mobility.

Fortunately, enterprises have a new option that delivers both mobility and security - user-centric networks from Aruba. Aruba's user-centric networks integrate adaptive WLANs, identity-based security, and application continuity services into a cohesive, high-performance system that securely delivers the enterprise network wherever users work or roam. User-centric networks significantly expand the reach of traditional port-centric networks, preserving and extending investments in existing network infrastructure. Additionally, the high performance and robustness of Aruba's solutions provide the first viable alternative to wired networks, making the all-wireless office a reality.

Adaptive WLANs deliver high-performance, follow-me connectivity so users are always within reach of mission-critical information. Identity-based security associates access policies with users, not ports, enabling follow-me security that is enforced regardless of where and how the networked is accessed. Application continuity services enable follow-me applications that continue running even as the user moves between wireless LANs, wired LANs, and cellular networks.


The Components of User-Centric Networks

Aruba's user-centric networks deliver both mobility and security without compromise. The cost, convenience, and security benefits of user-centric networks are fundamentally changing how and where we work.

Aruba Solution

Aruba has integrated all of the elements required to deliver enterprise mobility - security, application, network and radio frequency (RF) management services - into a unified solution. The components of this solution include an award-winning portfolio of wireless LAN, security, diagnostic, network management, and integration products backed by a worldwide support and training organization. Components include:
  • ArubaOS operating system for delivering user-centric enterprise mobility
  • ArubaOS software modules for value-added security and mobility features including mesh networking, wireless intrusion detection, and remote access
  • Aruba Endpoint Compliance System for Network Access Control
  • Aruba Mobility Management System for centralized management
  • Aruba Mobility Controllers for flexible, high-performance support of the ArubaOS operating system and software modules
  • Aruba Access Points and Access Concentrators that provide wireless and wireline access to Aruba Mobility Controllers

Typical Applications

User-centric networks are applicable across a wide range of uses in enterprise, education, finance, government, healthcare, hospitality, and retail applications. To learn more about how Aruba's solutions are being used to enable various applications and industries, please follow the links below.

Aruba Technology: The Move to User-Centric Networking

Our increasingly mobile society is forcing many industries to develop ways to make their services accessible whenever and wherever customers require them. In the not too distant past, one could conduct banking transactions only at a bank branch and only during business hours. As mobile customers demanded more convenient access to banking services, banks moved away from an institution-centric model of business to a user-centric model in which banking applications were brought to the customer. The bank branch gave way to the ATM and ultimately to the smart card.
Illustration of Aruba Technology

The Shift from Institution-Centric to User-Centric Products and Services

Increased mobility for the customer, however, resulted in reduced control and security for banks. Unauthorized card duplication, phishing, and ATM substitution all skyrocketed as banking products and services moved closer to the user. The demand for mobility fostered innovations which, in turn, undermined security.

The networking industry is undergoing a similar transformation, and facing the same issues, as the banking industry. Enterprises want to enable users to work wherever and whenever it is most convenient, economical, and expeditious for them to do so - in the office, at home, in hotels, or on the road. The issue is that traditional, port-centric networks use perimeter-based security that was designed and optimized for fixed, non-mobile users. For traditional network suppliers mobility breaks security, and security precludes mobility.

Fortunately, enterprises have a new option that delivers both mobility and security - user-centric networks from Aruba. Aruba's user-centric networks integrate adaptive WLANs, identity-based security, and application continuity services into a cohesive, high-performance system that securely delivers the enterprise network wherever users work or roam. User-centric networks significantly expand the reach of traditional port-centric networks, preserving and extending investments in existing network infrastructure. Additionally, the high performance and robustness of Aruba's solutions provide the first viable alternative to wired networks, making the all-wireless office a reality.

Adaptive WLANs deliver high-performance, follow-me connectivity so users are always within reach of mission-critical information. Identity-based security associates access policies with users, not ports, enabling follow-me security that is enforced regardless of where and how the networked is accessed. Application continuity services enable follow-me applications that continue running even as the user moves between wireless LANs, wired LANs, and cellular networks.


The Components of User-Centric Networks

Aruba's user-centric networks deliver both mobility and security without compromise. The cost, convenience, and security benefits of user-centric networks are fundamentally changing how and where we work.

Aruba Solution

Aruba has integrated all of the elements required to deliver enterprise mobility - security, application, network and radio frequency (RF) management services - into a unified solution. The components of this solution include an award-winning portfolio of wireless LAN, security, diagnostic, network management, and integration products backed by a worldwide support and training organization. Components include:
  • ArubaOS operating system for delivering user-centric enterprise mobility
  • ArubaOS software modules for value-added security and mobility features including mesh networking, wireless intrusion detection, and remote access
  • Aruba Endpoint Compliance System for Network Access Control
  • Aruba Mobility Management System for centralized management
  • Aruba Mobility Controllers for flexible, high-performance support of the ArubaOS operating system and software modules
  • Aruba Access Points and Access Concentrators that provide wireless and wireline access to Aruba Mobility Controllers

Typical Applications

User-centric networks are applicable across a wide range of uses in enterprise, education, finance, government, healthcare, hospitality, and retail applications. To learn more about how Aruba's solutions are being used to enable various applications and industries, please follow the links below.

Sunday, 11 November 2007

Securing Wireless LANs with PEAP and Passwords

The wireless local area network (WLAN) solution described in this documentation works equally well with either dynamic Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) WLAN protection. The implementation differences between the two are minor and are documented in this appendix.

Currently, there are some potential difficulties with using WPA, which include:

Manual configuration of WPA settings: The support for setting Windows XP client WPA settings using group policy is not available in the versions of Windows earlier than Windows Server™ 2003 Service Pack 1. Until Service Pack 1 is available and you have deployed it in your organization, you will have to configure your clients manually (there is no way to script WLAN settings for Windows XP). You need to install Service Pack 1 only on the server on which you are editing the WLAN settings Group Policy object (GPO); it is not required on the clients, domain controllers, or IAS servers.

Restricted availability of WLAN clients: At the time of writing, Microsoft only provides WPA support for Windows XP Service Pack 1 and later.

Availability of WPA compliant hardware: Although WPA support is now mandatory for all Wi-Fi certified hardware, existing network equipment may need to be upgraded to support WPA. You will need to obtain firmware updates for any access points or network adapters that do not currently support WPA. In some (rare) cases, you may need to replace equipment if the manufacturer does not produce WPA updates.


Using WPA in Place of WEP
Although the majority of the guide is applicable to both WPA and dynamic WEP, there are two main points in the documentation where the instructions differ:

• The “Creating an IAS Remote Access Policy for WLAN” section in Chapter 5, “Building the Wireless LAN Security Infrastructure.”

• The “Creating the WLAN Settings GPO” section in Chapter 6, “Configuring the Wireless LAN Clients.”


Creating an IAS Remote Access Policy for WLAN with WPA
To use WPA WLAN protection in place of dynamic WEP, you should set the client session time–out value to 8 hours instead of 60 minutes. WPA has an in–built mechanism to generate new WLAN encryption keys, so it does not need to force the clients to re–authenticate frequently. Eight hours is a reasonable value to ensure that clients have valid up–to–date credentials (for example, it ensures that a client cannot remain connected for excessive periods after its account has been disabled). In very high security environments, you can reduce this time–out value, if needed.

In the "Modifying the WLAN Access Policy Profile Settings" section in Chapter 5, “Building the Wireless LAN Security Infrastructure,” use the following procedure to set the remote access policy profile settings:

To modify wireless access policy profile settings:

1. In the Internet Authentication Service MMC, open the properties of the Allow Wireless LAN Access policy, and then click Edit Profile.

2. On the Dial-in Contraints tab, in the Minutes clients can be connected (Session-Timeout) field, type the value 480 (480 minutes or 8hours).

3. On the Advanced tab, add the Ignore-User-Dialin-Properties attribute, set it to True, and then add the Termination-Action attribute and set it to RADIUS Request.


You also need to change the session time–out in the wireless access point (AP) to match (or exceed) the time–out value set in this procedure.

Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings for WPA
Until GPO support becomes available in Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1, you must configure WPA settings on the client manually. WPA is supported on Windows XP Service Pack 1 with the WPA client download installed (or on Windows XP Service Pack 2).

Note: When GPO support becomes available, you can also use the following procedure to create a Wireless Network Policy using the same settings.

To manually configure WPA WLAN settings:

1. Open the properties of the Wireless Network interface. If the WLAN is displayed in the Available Networks list, select it, and click Configure..., otherwise click Add (in the Preferred Networks section).

2. Type the WLAN name into the Network Name (SSID) field (if it is not already displayed there) and, in the Description field, enter a description of the network.

Note: If you have an existing WLAN and you intend to run this side–by–side with the 802.1X–based WLAN of this solution, you must use a different Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the new WLAN. This new SSID should then be used here.

3. In the Wireless Network Key section, select WPA (not WPA PSK) as the Network Authentication type and TKIP as the Data Encryption type. (If your hardware supports it, you can choose the higher strength Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in place of TKIP).

4. Click the IEEE 802.1x tab, and select Protected EAP (PEAP) from the EAP Type drop–down list.

5. Click the Settings... button to modify the PEAP settings. From the Trusted Root Certificate Authorities list, select the root CA certificate for the CA. (This is the CA that you installed to issue IAS server certificates—see Chapter 4 for more details).

Important: If you ever need to re–install your CA from scratch (not just restore from backup), you will need to edit the client settings and select the root CA certificate for the new CA.

6. Ensure that Secured Password (EAP-MS-CHAP v2) is selected in the Select Authentication Method and check the Enable Fast Reconnect option.

7. Close each properties window by clicking OK.


Configuring Pocket PC 2003 for WPA
WPA was not supported natively in Pocket PC 2003 at the time of writing; however, this may be implemented in the future. Support for WPA on Pocket PC may also be available from other vendors.

Migrating from WEP to WPA
If you have deployed a secure WLAN solution based on dynamic WEP and want to migrate to WPA, you need to follow the steps in this section. You must ensure that you have deployed WPA software support (for example, the Windows XP WPA component) and hardware support (AP firmware and network adapter driver updates) prior to the migration. References in this procedure to configuring WPA settings in GPOs are only valid when the GPO is edited from Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 or later. This service pack had not been released at the time of writing. If you are not using Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 or later, follow the instructions given in the “Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings” section in this appendix.

To migrate from WEP to WPA, if your APs support dynamic WEP and WPA simultaneously:

1. Configure all wireless APs to support both dynamic WEP and WPA.

2. Create a new WLAN client settings GPO. Create a Wireless Network policy that configures the correct settings for WPA (refer to the procedure provided in the "Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings" section in this appendix). Then disable the existing WEP GPO and enable the WPA GPO so that all WPA settings are sent out to all clients. The clients will start using WPA on the WLAN following the next GPO refresh.

Note: If you are configuring your clients manually, you must disable the GPO that contains the WEP settings; if you do not do this, the manual WPA settings will be overwritten by the GPO.

3. Finally, you should update the IAS remote access policy session time–out and the client session time–out in the AP (as described in the "IAS Remote Access Policy" section earlier in this appendix).

To migrate from WEP to WPA, if your APs do not support simultaneous use of WEP and WPA:

1. Create a new WLAN SSID for the WPA network.

2. Edit the client network settings GPO and add the new SSID using WPA parameters (as described in the "Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings" section earlier in this appendix). If you are configuring your clients manually, you should configure them with the new SSID and WPA settings for that SSID. Do not remove the settings for the old WEP SSID in either case.

3. Working site–by–site, reconfigure your APs from WEP to WPA support, changing the SSID of the AP. As you reconfigure each AP, the clients will switch to the new SSID and use WPA.

4. Once you have reconfigured all APs, you can update the remote access policies on all IAS servers. You need to increase the session time–out value in the remote access policy (from 60 minutes to 8 hours) and change the same setting in the wireless APs (as described in the "IAS Remote Access Policy" section in this appendix).

5. Once the migration is complete, you can remove the WEP SSID from the GPO.


References
This section provides references to important supplementary information or other background material relevant to this appendix.

• The Cable Guy — March 2003, Wi-Fi Protected Access™ (WPA) Overview, available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/
cableguy/cg0303.mspx

• Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 815485, "Overview of the WPA Wireless Security Update in Windows XP," available at the following URL:

http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=815485

• Microsoft Press Pass Announcement on WPA Availability, available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/mar03/03-31WiFiProtectedAccessPR.mspx

• "Wireless 802.11 Security with Windows XP" white paper available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/pro/techinfo/
administration/wirelesssecurity/

Securing Wireless LANs with PEAP and Passwords

The wireless local area network (WLAN) solution described in this documentation works equally well with either dynamic Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) WLAN protection. The implementation differences between the two are minor and are documented in this appendix.

Currently, there are some potential difficulties with using WPA, which include:

Manual configuration of WPA settings: The support for setting Windows XP client WPA settings using group policy is not available in the versions of Windows earlier than Windows Server™ 2003 Service Pack 1. Until Service Pack 1 is available and you have deployed it in your organization, you will have to configure your clients manually (there is no way to script WLAN settings for Windows XP). You need to install Service Pack 1 only on the server on which you are editing the WLAN settings Group Policy object (GPO); it is not required on the clients, domain controllers, or IAS servers.

Restricted availability of WLAN clients: At the time of writing, Microsoft only provides WPA support for Windows XP Service Pack 1 and later.

Availability of WPA compliant hardware: Although WPA support is now mandatory for all Wi-Fi certified hardware, existing network equipment may need to be upgraded to support WPA. You will need to obtain firmware updates for any access points or network adapters that do not currently support WPA. In some (rare) cases, you may need to replace equipment if the manufacturer does not produce WPA updates.


Using WPA in Place of WEP
Although the majority of the guide is applicable to both WPA and dynamic WEP, there are two main points in the documentation where the instructions differ:

• The “Creating an IAS Remote Access Policy for WLAN” section in Chapter 5, “Building the Wireless LAN Security Infrastructure.”

• The “Creating the WLAN Settings GPO” section in Chapter 6, “Configuring the Wireless LAN Clients.”


Creating an IAS Remote Access Policy for WLAN with WPA
To use WPA WLAN protection in place of dynamic WEP, you should set the client session time–out value to 8 hours instead of 60 minutes. WPA has an in–built mechanism to generate new WLAN encryption keys, so it does not need to force the clients to re–authenticate frequently. Eight hours is a reasonable value to ensure that clients have valid up–to–date credentials (for example, it ensures that a client cannot remain connected for excessive periods after its account has been disabled). In very high security environments, you can reduce this time–out value, if needed.

In the "Modifying the WLAN Access Policy Profile Settings" section in Chapter 5, “Building the Wireless LAN Security Infrastructure,” use the following procedure to set the remote access policy profile settings:

To modify wireless access policy profile settings:

1. In the Internet Authentication Service MMC, open the properties of the Allow Wireless LAN Access policy, and then click Edit Profile.

2. On the Dial-in Contraints tab, in the Minutes clients can be connected (Session-Timeout) field, type the value 480 (480 minutes or 8hours).

3. On the Advanced tab, add the Ignore-User-Dialin-Properties attribute, set it to True, and then add the Termination-Action attribute and set it to RADIUS Request.


You also need to change the session time–out in the wireless access point (AP) to match (or exceed) the time–out value set in this procedure.

Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings for WPA
Until GPO support becomes available in Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1, you must configure WPA settings on the client manually. WPA is supported on Windows XP Service Pack 1 with the WPA client download installed (or on Windows XP Service Pack 2).

Note: When GPO support becomes available, you can also use the following procedure to create a Wireless Network Policy using the same settings.

To manually configure WPA WLAN settings:

1. Open the properties of the Wireless Network interface. If the WLAN is displayed in the Available Networks list, select it, and click Configure..., otherwise click Add (in the Preferred Networks section).

2. Type the WLAN name into the Network Name (SSID) field (if it is not already displayed there) and, in the Description field, enter a description of the network.

Note: If you have an existing WLAN and you intend to run this side–by–side with the 802.1X–based WLAN of this solution, you must use a different Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the new WLAN. This new SSID should then be used here.

3. In the Wireless Network Key section, select WPA (not WPA PSK) as the Network Authentication type and TKIP as the Data Encryption type. (If your hardware supports it, you can choose the higher strength Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in place of TKIP).

4. Click the IEEE 802.1x tab, and select Protected EAP (PEAP) from the EAP Type drop–down list.

5. Click the Settings... button to modify the PEAP settings. From the Trusted Root Certificate Authorities list, select the root CA certificate for the CA. (This is the CA that you installed to issue IAS server certificates—see Chapter 4 for more details).

Important: If you ever need to re–install your CA from scratch (not just restore from backup), you will need to edit the client settings and select the root CA certificate for the new CA.

6. Ensure that Secured Password (EAP-MS-CHAP v2) is selected in the Select Authentication Method and check the Enable Fast Reconnect option.

7. Close each properties window by clicking OK.


Configuring Pocket PC 2003 for WPA
WPA was not supported natively in Pocket PC 2003 at the time of writing; however, this may be implemented in the future. Support for WPA on Pocket PC may also be available from other vendors.

Migrating from WEP to WPA
If you have deployed a secure WLAN solution based on dynamic WEP and want to migrate to WPA, you need to follow the steps in this section. You must ensure that you have deployed WPA software support (for example, the Windows XP WPA component) and hardware support (AP firmware and network adapter driver updates) prior to the migration. References in this procedure to configuring WPA settings in GPOs are only valid when the GPO is edited from Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 or later. This service pack had not been released at the time of writing. If you are not using Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 or later, follow the instructions given in the “Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings” section in this appendix.

To migrate from WEP to WPA, if your APs support dynamic WEP and WPA simultaneously:

1. Configure all wireless APs to support both dynamic WEP and WPA.

2. Create a new WLAN client settings GPO. Create a Wireless Network policy that configures the correct settings for WPA (refer to the procedure provided in the "Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings" section in this appendix). Then disable the existing WEP GPO and enable the WPA GPO so that all WPA settings are sent out to all clients. The clients will start using WPA on the WLAN following the next GPO refresh.

Note: If you are configuring your clients manually, you must disable the GPO that contains the WEP settings; if you do not do this, the manual WPA settings will be overwritten by the GPO.

3. Finally, you should update the IAS remote access policy session time–out and the client session time–out in the AP (as described in the "IAS Remote Access Policy" section earlier in this appendix).

To migrate from WEP to WPA, if your APs do not support simultaneous use of WEP and WPA:

1. Create a new WLAN SSID for the WPA network.

2. Edit the client network settings GPO and add the new SSID using WPA parameters (as described in the "Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings" section earlier in this appendix). If you are configuring your clients manually, you should configure them with the new SSID and WPA settings for that SSID. Do not remove the settings for the old WEP SSID in either case.

3. Working site–by–site, reconfigure your APs from WEP to WPA support, changing the SSID of the AP. As you reconfigure each AP, the clients will switch to the new SSID and use WPA.

4. Once you have reconfigured all APs, you can update the remote access policies on all IAS servers. You need to increase the session time–out value in the remote access policy (from 60 minutes to 8 hours) and change the same setting in the wireless APs (as described in the "IAS Remote Access Policy" section in this appendix).

5. Once the migration is complete, you can remove the WEP SSID from the GPO.


References
This section provides references to important supplementary information or other background material relevant to this appendix.

• The Cable Guy — March 2003, Wi-Fi Protected Access™ (WPA) Overview, available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/
cableguy/cg0303.mspx

• Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 815485, "Overview of the WPA Wireless Security Update in Windows XP," available at the following URL:

http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=815485

• Microsoft Press Pass Announcement on WPA Availability, available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/mar03/03-31WiFiProtectedAccessPR.mspx

• "Wireless 802.11 Security with Windows XP" white paper available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/pro/techinfo/
administration/wirelesssecurity/

Securing Wireless LANs with PEAP and Passwords

The wireless local area network (WLAN) solution described in this documentation works equally well with either dynamic Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) WLAN protection. The implementation differences between the two are minor and are documented in this appendix.

Currently, there are some potential difficulties with using WPA, which include:

Manual configuration of WPA settings: The support for setting Windows XP client WPA settings using group policy is not available in the versions of Windows earlier than Windows Server™ 2003 Service Pack 1. Until Service Pack 1 is available and you have deployed it in your organization, you will have to configure your clients manually (there is no way to script WLAN settings for Windows XP). You need to install Service Pack 1 only on the server on which you are editing the WLAN settings Group Policy object (GPO); it is not required on the clients, domain controllers, or IAS servers.

Restricted availability of WLAN clients: At the time of writing, Microsoft only provides WPA support for Windows XP Service Pack 1 and later.

Availability of WPA compliant hardware: Although WPA support is now mandatory for all Wi-Fi certified hardware, existing network equipment may need to be upgraded to support WPA. You will need to obtain firmware updates for any access points or network adapters that do not currently support WPA. In some (rare) cases, you may need to replace equipment if the manufacturer does not produce WPA updates.


Using WPA in Place of WEP
Although the majority of the guide is applicable to both WPA and dynamic WEP, there are two main points in the documentation where the instructions differ:

• The “Creating an IAS Remote Access Policy for WLAN” section in Chapter 5, “Building the Wireless LAN Security Infrastructure.”

• The “Creating the WLAN Settings GPO” section in Chapter 6, “Configuring the Wireless LAN Clients.”


Creating an IAS Remote Access Policy for WLAN with WPA
To use WPA WLAN protection in place of dynamic WEP, you should set the client session time–out value to 8 hours instead of 60 minutes. WPA has an in–built mechanism to generate new WLAN encryption keys, so it does not need to force the clients to re–authenticate frequently. Eight hours is a reasonable value to ensure that clients have valid up–to–date credentials (for example, it ensures that a client cannot remain connected for excessive periods after its account has been disabled). In very high security environments, you can reduce this time–out value, if needed.

In the "Modifying the WLAN Access Policy Profile Settings" section in Chapter 5, “Building the Wireless LAN Security Infrastructure,” use the following procedure to set the remote access policy profile settings:

To modify wireless access policy profile settings:

1. In the Internet Authentication Service MMC, open the properties of the Allow Wireless LAN Access policy, and then click Edit Profile.

2. On the Dial-in Contraints tab, in the Minutes clients can be connected (Session-Timeout) field, type the value 480 (480 minutes or 8hours).

3. On the Advanced tab, add the Ignore-User-Dialin-Properties attribute, set it to True, and then add the Termination-Action attribute and set it to RADIUS Request.


You also need to change the session time–out in the wireless access point (AP) to match (or exceed) the time–out value set in this procedure.

Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings for WPA
Until GPO support becomes available in Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1, you must configure WPA settings on the client manually. WPA is supported on Windows XP Service Pack 1 with the WPA client download installed (or on Windows XP Service Pack 2).

Note: When GPO support becomes available, you can also use the following procedure to create a Wireless Network Policy using the same settings.

To manually configure WPA WLAN settings:

1. Open the properties of the Wireless Network interface. If the WLAN is displayed in the Available Networks list, select it, and click Configure..., otherwise click Add (in the Preferred Networks section).

2. Type the WLAN name into the Network Name (SSID) field (if it is not already displayed there) and, in the Description field, enter a description of the network.

Note: If you have an existing WLAN and you intend to run this side–by–side with the 802.1X–based WLAN of this solution, you must use a different Service Set Identifier (SSID) for the new WLAN. This new SSID should then be used here.

3. In the Wireless Network Key section, select WPA (not WPA PSK) as the Network Authentication type and TKIP as the Data Encryption type. (If your hardware supports it, you can choose the higher strength Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in place of TKIP).

4. Click the IEEE 802.1x tab, and select Protected EAP (PEAP) from the EAP Type drop–down list.

5. Click the Settings... button to modify the PEAP settings. From the Trusted Root Certificate Authorities list, select the root CA certificate for the CA. (This is the CA that you installed to issue IAS server certificates—see Chapter 4 for more details).

Important: If you ever need to re–install your CA from scratch (not just restore from backup), you will need to edit the client settings and select the root CA certificate for the new CA.

6. Ensure that Secured Password (EAP-MS-CHAP v2) is selected in the Select Authentication Method and check the Enable Fast Reconnect option.

7. Close each properties window by clicking OK.


Configuring Pocket PC 2003 for WPA
WPA was not supported natively in Pocket PC 2003 at the time of writing; however, this may be implemented in the future. Support for WPA on Pocket PC may also be available from other vendors.

Migrating from WEP to WPA
If you have deployed a secure WLAN solution based on dynamic WEP and want to migrate to WPA, you need to follow the steps in this section. You must ensure that you have deployed WPA software support (for example, the Windows XP WPA component) and hardware support (AP firmware and network adapter driver updates) prior to the migration. References in this procedure to configuring WPA settings in GPOs are only valid when the GPO is edited from Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 or later. This service pack had not been released at the time of writing. If you are not using Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 or later, follow the instructions given in the “Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings” section in this appendix.

To migrate from WEP to WPA, if your APs support dynamic WEP and WPA simultaneously:

1. Configure all wireless APs to support both dynamic WEP and WPA.

2. Create a new WLAN client settings GPO. Create a Wireless Network policy that configures the correct settings for WPA (refer to the procedure provided in the "Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings" section in this appendix). Then disable the existing WEP GPO and enable the WPA GPO so that all WPA settings are sent out to all clients. The clients will start using WPA on the WLAN following the next GPO refresh.

Note: If you are configuring your clients manually, you must disable the GPO that contains the WEP settings; if you do not do this, the manual WPA settings will be overwritten by the GPO.

3. Finally, you should update the IAS remote access policy session time–out and the client session time–out in the AP (as described in the "IAS Remote Access Policy" section earlier in this appendix).

To migrate from WEP to WPA, if your APs do not support simultaneous use of WEP and WPA:

1. Create a new WLAN SSID for the WPA network.

2. Edit the client network settings GPO and add the new SSID using WPA parameters (as described in the "Manually Configuring Windows XP WLAN Settings" section earlier in this appendix). If you are configuring your clients manually, you should configure them with the new SSID and WPA settings for that SSID. Do not remove the settings for the old WEP SSID in either case.

3. Working site–by–site, reconfigure your APs from WEP to WPA support, changing the SSID of the AP. As you reconfigure each AP, the clients will switch to the new SSID and use WPA.

4. Once you have reconfigured all APs, you can update the remote access policies on all IAS servers. You need to increase the session time–out value in the remote access policy (from 60 minutes to 8 hours) and change the same setting in the wireless APs (as described in the "IAS Remote Access Policy" section in this appendix).

5. Once the migration is complete, you can remove the WEP SSID from the GPO.


References
This section provides references to important supplementary information or other background material relevant to this appendix.

• The Cable Guy — March 2003, Wi-Fi Protected Access™ (WPA) Overview, available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/community/columns/
cableguy/cg0303.mspx

• Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 815485, "Overview of the WPA Wireless Security Update in Windows XP," available at the following URL:

http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=815485

• Microsoft Press Pass Announcement on WPA Availability, available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/mar03/03-31WiFiProtectedAccessPR.mspx

• "Wireless 802.11 Security with Windows XP" white paper available at the following URL:

http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/pro/techinfo/
administration/wirelesssecurity/

Thursday, 18 October 2007

Researchers crafting intelligent, scaleable WLAN defense

By John Cox

Protecting enterprise wireless networks from increasingly sophisticated attacks is the focus of a research project from the Dept. of Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), a pilot of which is just wrapping up at Dartmouth College.

Researchers from Dartmouth and Aruba Networks are developing a battery of algorithms and a software architecture running over radio frequency sensors to measure and analyze traffic and then react to wireless LAN (WLAN) attacks, especially to the spoofing and evasion that are ever more common today.

There are commercial wireless intrusion-detection systems (IDS) today from AirDefense, AirTight Networks, Network Chemistry, and Aruba itself. But Project MAP -- the acronym stands for measure, analyze and protect -- has two ambitious, distinguishing goals. First, it is an IDS that's far more intelligent in what and how it measures and analyzes wireless traffic. Second, it is an IDS that can handle not only the traffic from thousands of access points and clients, but also the flood of measurement data that its own RF sensors, or sniffers, will create.

Smarter is better
Smarter software is needed because attacks are becoming smarter and sneakier.

"The IDS [today] may not see certain frames, or the attacker may be doing radio frequency jamming, causing the attack to be invisible," says Josh Wright, senior security researcher with Aruba. "Attackers are using evasion techniques, and these are not being addressed by today's [IDS] products."

Scalability is essential to the project's design because the RF sensors will continuously track, collect, and combine a lot of real-time data about a site's entire radio environment.

Launched in summer of 2005, Project MAP is funded by the Department of Homeland Security through DARPA. The researchers are starting to analyze the results of a test MAP deployment at one building on the Dartmouth campus. Those results will guide changes, tweaks, and refinements to the software through the first half of 2007. By the end of 2007, researcher plan to have deployed a full-production MAP system over a major part of Dartmouth's sprawling wireless network.

The pilot consists of off-the-shelf Aruba RF sniffers, which basically are 802.11a/b/g access points that listen only for radio signals. The MAP software listens to the traffic on all channels, measuring a range of statistics, aggregates that information to create an accurate picture of what's happening in the air, and then scans for evidence of attacks, says David Kotz, a Dartmouth professor of computer science and one of the lead MAP researchers.

Lots of RF sniffers
Instead of trying to minimize the number of sniffers, MAP will do the opposite, deploying lots of them to provide effective coverage of all the access points, authorized clients, and attacking clients. "All three devices are involved in an attack," Kotz says. "An attacker may present itself as an access point and tell an authorized client to disassociate [from a legitimate access point]. You may need more than one sniffer to collect the needed data from all three of these parties, which may be separated by some considerable distance."

"We're trying to get as high a resolution 'snapshot' of the net as we can with lots of sniffers and data aggregation," Kotz says.

MAP is intended to be resilient enough to work successfully in the face of the numerous variables and glitches that exist in WLANs. "Sniffers might not be able to collect all the needed packets because of things like packet collisions, RF reflections, or misaligned antennas," says Tristan Henderson, assistant professor of computer science and a MAP researcher. "So we're building algorithms on the assumption that we won't be able to collect everything."

Higher-level stats, and accuracy
Some commercial IDS systems require that every single frame be checked to see if it matches known attack signatures, Henderson says. By contrast, MAP analyzes higher-level statistics. "We can look at statistics about the proportion of control traffic to data traffic in various type of attacks," he says, revealing a pattern that may signal malicious activity. "We can be more certain about an attack than other techniques that rely on capturing every frame."

MAP will also monitor aggressively all 802.11 channels for activity. "Most other products configure their sniffers to listen to only one channel all the time, or to rotate through all the channels, spending the same amount of time listening to each one," Kotz says. MAP adds intelligence; it cycles through all the channels, but spends more time on the busiest ones. In addition, the MAP sensors can be refocused quickly on a channel with suspicious activity. "The software says 'this client appears to be under attack' and it tells the MAP measurement system to get more information," Kotz says. "The measurement system [software] refocuses and spends more time listening to that client."

MAP is intended to be effective against denial-of-service attacks, as well as against a new category of attacks called "reduction of quality (RoQ)." An RoQ attack doesn't deny service completely. Instead, it degrades the quality of the connection or the available bandwidth, either to disrupt communications for others or to get better service for the attacker. A wireless VoIP call, for example, might stay connected but be so plagued with dropped packets or other problems as to be useless.

"It's hard to detect who's doing it, or even whether it's being done at all," Henderson says. "You need much more sophisticated techniques to detect these attacks."

Countering evasive tactics
A higher level of sophistication also is needed to counter the evasive techniques that attackers are starting to exploit, Aruba's Wright says. For example, an access point legitimately can direct a client to deauthenticate in certain cases, so deauthentication traffic is normal on a WLAN. The problem, Wright says, is that an attacker also can use deauthentication traffic to enable, and mask, a denial-of-service attack. More recently, he says, it's being used to trigger software flaws in WLAN driver code.

As part of developing this greater sophistication, MAP researchers are working to improve the accuracy of attack identification, thereby eliminating false alarms (false positives) as well as false negatives -- real attacks that the IDS doesn't recognize.

If successful, MAP could create the foundation of a dynamic WLAN security system that can monitor continuously for, and adapt to, constantly changing attacks.

Researchers crafting intelligent, scaleable WLAN defense

By John Cox

Protecting enterprise wireless networks from increasingly sophisticated attacks is the focus of a research project from the Dept. of Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), a pilot of which is just wrapping up at Dartmouth College.

Researchers from Dartmouth and Aruba Networks are developing a battery of algorithms and a software architecture running over radio frequency sensors to measure and analyze traffic and then react to wireless LAN (WLAN) attacks, especially to the spoofing and evasion that are ever more common today.

There are commercial wireless intrusion-detection systems (IDS) today from AirDefense, AirTight Networks, Network Chemistry, and Aruba itself. But Project MAP -- the acronym stands for measure, analyze and protect -- has two ambitious, distinguishing goals. First, it is an IDS that's far more intelligent in what and how it measures and analyzes wireless traffic. Second, it is an IDS that can handle not only the traffic from thousands of access points and clients, but also the flood of measurement data that its own RF sensors, or sniffers, will create.

Smarter is better
Smarter software is needed because attacks are becoming smarter and sneakier.

"The IDS [today] may not see certain frames, or the attacker may be doing radio frequency jamming, causing the attack to be invisible," says Josh Wright, senior security researcher with Aruba. "Attackers are using evasion techniques, and these are not being addressed by today's [IDS] products."

Scalability is essential to the project's design because the RF sensors will continuously track, collect, and combine a lot of real-time data about a site's entire radio environment.

Launched in summer of 2005, Project MAP is funded by the Department of Homeland Security through DARPA. The researchers are starting to analyze the results of a test MAP deployment at one building on the Dartmouth campus. Those results will guide changes, tweaks, and refinements to the software through the first half of 2007. By the end of 2007, researcher plan to have deployed a full-production MAP system over a major part of Dartmouth's sprawling wireless network.

The pilot consists of off-the-shelf Aruba RF sniffers, which basically are 802.11a/b/g access points that listen only for radio signals. The MAP software listens to the traffic on all channels, measuring a range of statistics, aggregates that information to create an accurate picture of what's happening in the air, and then scans for evidence of attacks, says David Kotz, a Dartmouth professor of computer science and one of the lead MAP researchers.

Lots of RF sniffers
Instead of trying to minimize the number of sniffers, MAP will do the opposite, deploying lots of them to provide effective coverage of all the access points, authorized clients, and attacking clients. "All three devices are involved in an attack," Kotz says. "An attacker may present itself as an access point and tell an authorized client to disassociate [from a legitimate access point]. You may need more than one sniffer to collect the needed data from all three of these parties, which may be separated by some considerable distance."

"We're trying to get as high a resolution 'snapshot' of the net as we can with lots of sniffers and data aggregation," Kotz says.

MAP is intended to be resilient enough to work successfully in the face of the numerous variables and glitches that exist in WLANs. "Sniffers might not be able to collect all the needed packets because of things like packet collisions, RF reflections, or misaligned antennas," says Tristan Henderson, assistant professor of computer science and a MAP researcher. "So we're building algorithms on the assumption that we won't be able to collect everything."

Higher-level stats, and accuracy
Some commercial IDS systems require that every single frame be checked to see if it matches known attack signatures, Henderson says. By contrast, MAP analyzes higher-level statistics. "We can look at statistics about the proportion of control traffic to data traffic in various type of attacks," he says, revealing a pattern that may signal malicious activity. "We can be more certain about an attack than other techniques that rely on capturing every frame."

MAP will also monitor aggressively all 802.11 channels for activity. "Most other products configure their sniffers to listen to only one channel all the time, or to rotate through all the channels, spending the same amount of time listening to each one," Kotz says. MAP adds intelligence; it cycles through all the channels, but spends more time on the busiest ones. In addition, the MAP sensors can be refocused quickly on a channel with suspicious activity. "The software says 'this client appears to be under attack' and it tells the MAP measurement system to get more information," Kotz says. "The measurement system [software] refocuses and spends more time listening to that client."

MAP is intended to be effective against denial-of-service attacks, as well as against a new category of attacks called "reduction of quality (RoQ)." An RoQ attack doesn't deny service completely. Instead, it degrades the quality of the connection or the available bandwidth, either to disrupt communications for others or to get better service for the attacker. A wireless VoIP call, for example, might stay connected but be so plagued with dropped packets or other problems as to be useless.

"It's hard to detect who's doing it, or even whether it's being done at all," Henderson says. "You need much more sophisticated techniques to detect these attacks."

Countering evasive tactics
A higher level of sophistication also is needed to counter the evasive techniques that attackers are starting to exploit, Aruba's Wright says. For example, an access point legitimately can direct a client to deauthenticate in certain cases, so deauthentication traffic is normal on a WLAN. The problem, Wright says, is that an attacker also can use deauthentication traffic to enable, and mask, a denial-of-service attack. More recently, he says, it's being used to trigger software flaws in WLAN driver code.

As part of developing this greater sophistication, MAP researchers are working to improve the accuracy of attack identification, thereby eliminating false alarms (false positives) as well as false negatives -- real attacks that the IDS doesn't recognize.

If successful, MAP could create the foundation of a dynamic WLAN security system that can monitor continuously for, and adapt to, constantly changing attacks.

Researchers crafting intelligent, scaleable WLAN defense

By John Cox

Protecting enterprise wireless networks from increasingly sophisticated attacks is the focus of a research project from the Dept. of Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), a pilot of which is just wrapping up at Dartmouth College.

Researchers from Dartmouth and Aruba Networks are developing a battery of algorithms and a software architecture running over radio frequency sensors to measure and analyze traffic and then react to wireless LAN (WLAN) attacks, especially to the spoofing and evasion that are ever more common today.

There are commercial wireless intrusion-detection systems (IDS) today from AirDefense, AirTight Networks, Network Chemistry, and Aruba itself. But Project MAP -- the acronym stands for measure, analyze and protect -- has two ambitious, distinguishing goals. First, it is an IDS that's far more intelligent in what and how it measures and analyzes wireless traffic. Second, it is an IDS that can handle not only the traffic from thousands of access points and clients, but also the flood of measurement data that its own RF sensors, or sniffers, will create.

Smarter is better
Smarter software is needed because attacks are becoming smarter and sneakier.

"The IDS [today] may not see certain frames, or the attacker may be doing radio frequency jamming, causing the attack to be invisible," says Josh Wright, senior security researcher with Aruba. "Attackers are using evasion techniques, and these are not being addressed by today's [IDS] products."

Scalability is essential to the project's design because the RF sensors will continuously track, collect, and combine a lot of real-time data about a site's entire radio environment.

Launched in summer of 2005, Project MAP is funded by the Department of Homeland Security through DARPA. The researchers are starting to analyze the results of a test MAP deployment at one building on the Dartmouth campus. Those results will guide changes, tweaks, and refinements to the software through the first half of 2007. By the end of 2007, researcher plan to have deployed a full-production MAP system over a major part of Dartmouth's sprawling wireless network.

The pilot consists of off-the-shelf Aruba RF sniffers, which basically are 802.11a/b/g access points that listen only for radio signals. The MAP software listens to the traffic on all channels, measuring a range of statistics, aggregates that information to create an accurate picture of what's happening in the air, and then scans for evidence of attacks, says David Kotz, a Dartmouth professor of computer science and one of the lead MAP researchers.

Lots of RF sniffers
Instead of trying to minimize the number of sniffers, MAP will do the opposite, deploying lots of them to provide effective coverage of all the access points, authorized clients, and attacking clients. "All three devices are involved in an attack," Kotz says. "An attacker may present itself as an access point and tell an authorized client to disassociate [from a legitimate access point]. You may need more than one sniffer to collect the needed data from all three of these parties, which may be separated by some considerable distance."

"We're trying to get as high a resolution 'snapshot' of the net as we can with lots of sniffers and data aggregation," Kotz says.

MAP is intended to be resilient enough to work successfully in the face of the numerous variables and glitches that exist in WLANs. "Sniffers might not be able to collect all the needed packets because of things like packet collisions, RF reflections, or misaligned antennas," says Tristan Henderson, assistant professor of computer science and a MAP researcher. "So we're building algorithms on the assumption that we won't be able to collect everything."

Higher-level stats, and accuracy
Some commercial IDS systems require that every single frame be checked to see if it matches known attack signatures, Henderson says. By contrast, MAP analyzes higher-level statistics. "We can look at statistics about the proportion of control traffic to data traffic in various type of attacks," he says, revealing a pattern that may signal malicious activity. "We can be more certain about an attack than other techniques that rely on capturing every frame."

MAP will also monitor aggressively all 802.11 channels for activity. "Most other products configure their sniffers to listen to only one channel all the time, or to rotate through all the channels, spending the same amount of time listening to each one," Kotz says. MAP adds intelligence; it cycles through all the channels, but spends more time on the busiest ones. In addition, the MAP sensors can be refocused quickly on a channel with suspicious activity. "The software says 'this client appears to be under attack' and it tells the MAP measurement system to get more information," Kotz says. "The measurement system [software] refocuses and spends more time listening to that client."

MAP is intended to be effective against denial-of-service attacks, as well as against a new category of attacks called "reduction of quality (RoQ)." An RoQ attack doesn't deny service completely. Instead, it degrades the quality of the connection or the available bandwidth, either to disrupt communications for others or to get better service for the attacker. A wireless VoIP call, for example, might stay connected but be so plagued with dropped packets or other problems as to be useless.

"It's hard to detect who's doing it, or even whether it's being done at all," Henderson says. "You need much more sophisticated techniques to detect these attacks."

Countering evasive tactics
A higher level of sophistication also is needed to counter the evasive techniques that attackers are starting to exploit, Aruba's Wright says. For example, an access point legitimately can direct a client to deauthenticate in certain cases, so deauthentication traffic is normal on a WLAN. The problem, Wright says, is that an attacker also can use deauthentication traffic to enable, and mask, a denial-of-service attack. More recently, he says, it's being used to trigger software flaws in WLAN driver code.

As part of developing this greater sophistication, MAP researchers are working to improve the accuracy of attack identification, thereby eliminating false alarms (false positives) as well as false negatives -- real attacks that the IDS doesn't recognize.

If successful, MAP could create the foundation of a dynamic WLAN security system that can monitor continuously for, and adapt to, constantly changing attacks.